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Privacy-as-Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and
Moral Limits of the Paradigm

•
ANITA L. ALLEN

INTRODUCTION
Professor Paul M. Schwartz's article, Internet Privacy and the State, 1

poses two of the most important normative questions contemporary privacy
theorists should be asking and attempting to answer. The first question is
how, if at all, can we secure meaningful forms of privacy while remaining
appropriately accountable to others? The second question is what role, if
any, should the state play in the regulation of personal privacy? Professor
Schwartz's effort to answer these questions implicitly aims at locating
comfortable ground between the polar domains of extreme, unrecon
structed liberalism on the one hand and anti-liberal communitarianism or
civic republicanism on the other? Schwartz's "liberal" defines privacy as
control over personal information and is biased in favor of private sector
self-regulation.

His "communitarian" and "republican" are deeply skepti

cal of individual privacy and prt·'v>acy rights as threats to the common good
and civic virtue.

Schwartz defends an intermediate stance that falls some

where between liberalism and communitarianism.

Like a liberal, he ac

cepts privacy as a vital good and civil liberty.3 However, like a communi
tarian or civic republican, he redefines privacy as what he terms a "consti
tutive value."4

Schwartz believes individual privacy protection in some

contexts is a paramount public interest, and embraces a degree of state in
tervention to create and reinforce beneficial privacy norms.5

*

Thus, his

A.k.a., Anita L. Allen-Castellitto, Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania

School of Law; JD., Harvard Law School; Ph.D., University of Michigan.

1. Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacyand the State, 32 CONN. L. REv. 815 (2000).
2. Professor Schwartz defines his position through a critique of communitarians and republicans,
whom he groups together for these purposes, and free market liberals. See id. at 836.
3. Cf Pamela S amuelson, A New Kind of Privacy? Regulating Uses of Personal Data in the
Global Information Economy, 87 CAL. L. REv. 751,777 (1999) (assessing the implications of Profes
sor Schwartz's desire to treat data protection as a civil liberty).
4. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 816.
5. See id. at 8 16-17.
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general answer to the first question (about accountability) is that, for the
sake of forming a good society and shaping our identities, our society
should value privacy and undertake "line-drawing along different coordi
nates to shape permitted levels of scrutiny.'x;

His answer to the second

question (about state regulation) is that the state has an affirmative role to
play in the correction of information market failures and limiting prefer
ence falsification.7
I would like to comment on just one important aspect of Professor
Schwartz's thoughtful article: his rejection of the popular view that privacy
policy should seek to protect individuals' control over personal informa
tion.8

Professor Schwartz observes that the "leading paradigm on the

Internet and in the real, or, offline world, conceives of privacy as a per
sonal right to control the use of one's data."9 According to Schwartz, this
privacy-as-data control paradigm (which he calls the "privacy-control"
paradigm for short and which I will attempt to clarify below) "seeks to
place the individual at the center of decision-making about personal infor
mation use."10 Schwartz was right to take on the privacy-control assump
tion, for the reasons he gives and for additional reasons I will supply here.
I maintain that the popularity of the privacy-control paradigm is problem
atic because there are a number of conceptual, practical, and moral limits to
its plausibility. We liberals-! count myself as one11-are attracted to the
paradigm because it complements our focus on the interests of individual
persons as moral agents, but we m_ust concede its limitations and consider
alternatives. After clarifying the privacy-control paradigm in Part I, I will
identify its conceptual limitations in Part II, practical limitations in Part III,
and moral limitations in Part IV. I conclude, with Professor Schwartz, that
alternatives to the privacy-as-data control paradigm are needed to guide our
urgent philosophical and policy understandings of privacy and its protec
tion in the age of the Internet.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PRIVACY -CONTROL PARADIGM
In a book aimed at the lay public, Ann Cavoukian and Don Tapscott
identity several understandings of privacy but assert that: "An important
component of protecting privacy is maintaining control over information

6.

!d. at 834.

7.

See id. at 817.

8.

See id.at816.

9.

!d. at 820.

10.

!d.

11.

See Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 723 (1999) [hereinafter Allen,

Coercing Privacy]; see also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE
SOCIETY (1988) [hereinafter ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS).
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that is circulating about you-informational privacy."1 2 The view that pri
vacy is importantly or essentially about control over personal information
is promulgated in recent publications aimed at scholars and professionals.1 3
Focusing on current efforts t o design policies that accommodate informa
tional privacy concerns in cyberspace, Professor Schwartz concludes that
the "leading paradigm on the Internet and in the real, or offline world, con
ceives of privacy as a personal right to control the use of one's data."14 He
calls this paradigm "privacy-control" and describes the "weight of the con
sensus about the centrality of privacy-control" as "staggering."15 In fram
ing the problematic privacy-control paradigm for his critique, Schwartz
understands the paradigm to encompass a set of views about the definition
of "privacy," requirements of the "right to privacy," and the ideal aims of
privacy policy. In this section, I would like to clarify the parameters of the
privacy-control paradigm with which Schwartz takes issue and the extent
of its popularity.
Adding precision to Schwartz's presentation of the paradigm, I want to
suggest that the paradigm he identifies is comprised of three complex, dis
tinguishable, and severable notions. They are, first, the notion that the term
"privacy"

means

control (or rights of control) over the use of personal data

or information; second, the notion that the expression "right to privacy"
means

the right or claim to control the use of personal data or information;

and, third, the notion that the central aim of privacy regulation should be
promoting individuals' control (or rights of control) over personal data or
information. When I say that each notion is complex, I mean that each of
the three is amenable to detailed analysis that would reveal ambiguities too
subtle to interest most lawyers. When I say that each is distinguishable, I
mean that each one is a semantically distinct proposition from the other
two.

And when I say that each is severable, I mean that, while logically

consistent with the others, neither notion logically entails the other two.
So, for example, a person who believes that "privacy" means data control
might also believe, with complete logical consistency, that privacy regula
tion should not have as its central aim promoting individuals' control over
personal data or information.

Moreover, a person who believes that "pri

vacy" means data control and that "the right to privacy" means the right to
data control, is not logically committed to the beliefs that there is or should
12. ANN CAVOUKIAN & DON TAPSCOTT, WHO KNOWS: SAFEGUARDING YOUR PRIVACY IN A
(1997).
13 . See, e.g., Jerry Bennan & Deidre Mulligan, Prtvacy in the Digital Age: Work in Progress, 23
NOVA L. REv. 549, 557 n.11 (I 999). To that end, the authors rely on Alan Westin's much-quoted
definition of privacy as control over infonnation in his work Prtvacy and Freedom. See generally
ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS
OF CYBERSPACE 143 (1999) ("Privacy, as Ethan Katsh defines it, is the power to control what others
can come to know about you.").
14. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 820.
15. Jd.
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be a right to privacy, and that privacy regulation should aim at rationally
optimizing

or

otherwise

promoting

"informational

self-determination

through individual stewardship of personal data."16
The three aforementioned data-control notions form a paradigm be
cause they are complementary, not because they are mutually entailing.
They are complementary in the significant sense that, individually and as a
group, they cohere with liberal moral, political, and legal perspectives that
emphasize wide sway for individual autonomy. However, the data-control
paradigm is neither necessarily embraced in full by all liberals, nor rejected
in full by all non-liberals. As explained below, a liberal could reject a
definition emphasizing data control in favor of a broader definition of "pri
vacy" or of the "right to privacy."17 In addition, a liberal might easily re
ject individual data control as the central goal of privacy policy in key

regulatory regimes, such as laws regulating medical or financial informa

tion. Finally, a non-liberal could also hold the notion that "privacy" means
data control. Indeed, a communitarian could agree with a liberal that "pri
vacy" means control of personal data, but disagree about what rights of
privacy to recognize and what level of privacy protection society ought to
afford.
Schwartz asserts that the consensus about the privacy-control paradigm
is "staggering." I, too,

am

struck by the proliferation of the paradigm in

the privacy literature spawned by cyberspace.

Yet, there is less overall

consensus among privacy theorists than Schwartz acknowledges about at
least one of the three notions comprising the paradigm. When it comes to
the meaning or definition of "privacy" there is not as much consensus
about the identification of privacy with control over information as
Schwartz represents.18

On the contrary, there is no universally accepted

philosophical definition of "privacy." I attribute wide variation in defini
tional accounts of privacy "to the confluence of three factors: (a) variation
in the use and denotational and connotational meanings of 'privacy; ' (b)
variation in the purposes for which definition of 'privacy' is undertaken;
and (c) variation in approaches taken to the task of definition itself. "19
To be sure, a number of prominent policy analysts and theorists em
ploy the idea of control in their definitions of what privacy and the right to
privacy mean. Sometimes the term "control" is used expressly in a defini
tion of privacy, as where Charles Fried describes privacy as "control we

16. !d.
17.

See infra

note 28 and accompanying text.

Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has Been Trans
formed from a Right to a Commodity, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 153
18.

Cf Simon G. Davies,

(Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) ("The pursuit of a single definition of privacy has preoc
cupied so many travelers in this field that the quest has become a standard challenge in the privacy
field.").
19.

ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS,

supra note 11,

at 5.
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have over information about ourselves."20 Sometimes the concept is pres
ent without the term, as where Alan Westin wrote of the "claim of indi
viduals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and
to what extent information about them is communicated to others."21 The
concept of control even figures into accounts of privacy that go beyond
informational privacy to include physical, decisional, and proprietary
senses of the term.

Hence, Richard Parker characterized privacy as "con

trol over who can sense us,"22 and Tom Gerety defined privacy as "auton
omy or control over the intimacies of personal identity."23

Since defini

tions of privacy vary with the purpose for definition,24 these largely liberal
minded legal, social, and moral theorists defined privacy in terms of con
trol to complement their further view that just government and ideal social
practices should promote individual control over personal data. As previ
ously noted, communitarian critics of liberalism and liberal conceptions of
privacy might also define privacy

as

individual control over personal in

formation, for purposes of emphasizing the privacy sacrifices of accessi
bility and disclosure demanded of participation in responsible communi
ties.

II. THE CONCEPTUAL LIMITS OF THE DATA-CONTROL PARADIGM
One must acknowledge that many theorists have flatly rejected defini
tions of "privacy" that equate privacy with control over personal data?5
While some of the theorists who reject the control-emphatic definition have
done so as part of an effort to supplant liberalism, even liberals have re
jected control-based definitions of "privacy."

Theorists reject defining

"privacy" as control or rights of control for a number of reasons that point
to the conceptual limitations of the entire privacy-control paradigm itself.
For starters, some theorists, including liberal theorists, reject the notion
that "privacy" is best defined as a right, viewing it instead as a claim of
right.26 Others reject defining privacy as either a right or a claim of right,

24.

Prtvacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,482 (1968).
supra note 13, at 7.
Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RlJJGERS L. REv. 275,281 (1974).
Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233,236 (1977).
See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 11,at 6.

25.

They have similarly rejected definitions that define privacy as control over routes of observa

20.
21.
22.
23.

Charles Fried,
WESTfN,

See
supra note 11,at 18.
Cf Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY:

tion, control over routes of accessibility, control over decision-making, and control over identity.
ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS,
26.

AN ANTHOLOGY 346, 348-49 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed. , 1984) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY] (asking whether "privacy [is] a right, a claim, a form of control, a value?"
and answering that it is a "neutral" state of affairs).
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arguing that privacy is a set of cultural values and practices.27 Still others
present privacy as a factual condition or state of affairs that rights of pri
vacy, privacy claims, and cultural practices potentially protect.28
Theorists also reject control-based definitions on the ground that they
are too narrow.

These theorists insist on defining "privacy" broadly, to

better capture patterns of actual usage. The actual contemporary usage of
"privacy" in the United States is particularly broad.

"Privacy" can mean

informational privacy, but also physical, informational, and proprietary
privacy.Z9 When Americans describe abortion rights, the right to die, and
gay rights

as

protective of privacy they are not just talking about the right

to control personal data. They are talking about a degree of freedom from
unwanted intervention, decisional autonomy, and freedom of choice gener
ally. When Americans say they want "privacy" they may be interested in
conditions of solitude, the need for repose, or the seclusion needed for in
timacy rather than control over facts about themselves. Data control as a
general definition of "privacy" is implausible because it simply ignores
common meanings.

As a stipulative definition or a description of what

many people worry about in the context of online communications, "data
control" has more plausibility. However, even for purposes of discussing
issues in cyberspace, there appear to be good reasons for rejecting control
emphatic definitions of privacy.

A concept other than control may more

adequately capture the sense of "privacy" at issue in online contexts. One
such candidate is the concept of inaccessibility.
An examination of the philosophical literature that seeks to define pri
vacy and its value reveals that the privacy-as-control definitions so popular
with the data protection community are not the kinds of definitions of pri
vacy that have attracted the largest following among philosophers.30
27.

In-

See Jeffrey Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
supra note 26,at 300, 310 ("Privacy is a social practice. It involves a complex of behaviors .

PRJVACY,
.

.

."

).

28.

I include myself in this group. See generally ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 11, Chapter

29.

I distinguish and elaborate these four dimensions of privacy. See Anita L. Allen, Genetic Pri

I.

vacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in
DENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 34

GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFI

(Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (Briefly, informational privacy
concerns are about access to personal information; physical privacy concerns are about access to per
sons and personal spaces; decisional privacy concerns are about governmental and other third-party
interference with personal choices; and proprietary privacy concerns are about the appropriation and
ownership of interests in human personality.).
30. See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note II, at 11. As I have written:
Restricted-access definitions have identified privacy with a limitation on others' access to
the individual; the condition of being protected from unwanted access by others; lack of ac
cess to information related to intimacies; selective control over access to oneself or one's
group; an existential condition of limited access to an individual's life experiences and en
gagements; the state of limited access by others to certain modes of being in a person's life;
a limitation on access of one or more entities to an entity that possesses experiences; and as
the exclusive access of a person to a realm of his own. Privacy as a political ideal has been
interpreted in restricted access terms as an individual's freedom to secure conditions free
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deed, as recently as a dozen years ago, definitions emphasizing accessibil
ity and inaccessibility were arguably more pervasive than control-based
definitions.

On these theories, other than in contexts in which "privacy"

holds its decisional and proprietary meanings, privacy refers to a degree of
inaccessibility of a person or information about her to others' five senses
and surveillance devices.

I have been an advocate of such a view in the

past.31
The best conceptual reason for rejecting characterizations of privacy
that emphasize control may be that control over personal data appears to be
neither necessary nor sufficient for states of privacy to obtain.

Suppose

people had perfect control over personal data about themselves.

Would

they necessarily have privacy? The answer is surely no.

Having control

over personal information does not mean having privacy.

The person in

control of her data might elect to share personal information with others.
We have seen a lot of this in the age of cyberspace. For example, a couple
announced plans to lose their virginity live over the Internet to underscore
its special importance to them.32

A nurse chose to broadcast her double

mastectomy live over the Internet to educate the public about breast
cancer.33 A married woman choose to share the delivery of her third child
with other expectant parents by delivering her baby live over the Internet.34
Women have chosen to use "adult entertainment" Web sites to sell images
of

themselves

engaging

in

sexual

intercourse

or

sexually

explicit

fantasies.35 Like "Jenni," men and women have chosen to train Web video
cameras on the interiors of their dwellings and then sell or give away real
time images of their daily lives.36
from unwanted access. The concept of private affairs has been explained as being those ac
tivities and concerns of an individual that ought to be protected by limited access. Finally,
group privacy has been defined in terms of restrictions on others' access to one's group.
/d. at 11 (footnotes omitted).

In the intervening ten years, some philosophers of privacy have been critical both of control and
access oriented understandings of privacy.

See, e.g., PATRlCIA BOLING,

PRJVACY AND THE POLITICS OF

INTIMATE LIFE (1996); JULIE C. INNESS, PR1VACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (1992).

See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 11, at 3.
See Don Feder, Innocence Lost in Net Fishbowl, BOSTON HERALD, July 22, 1998, a t 029,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Bherald File.
33. See As Part of Breast Cancer Awareness Month, the Health Network Will Webcast Live Mas
tectomy and Breast Reconstruction Surgery, HEALTH NETWORK (Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www .ahn.com
31.

32.

!Press_Release/press_display. asp?idocid=4667>.
34.

In June 1998, a woman who revealed her name only as "Elizabeth" gave birth live over the

Internet to "Baby Sean" in the Arnold Palmer Hospital in Orlando, Florida The mother declared her

See Ellen Goodman, Internet Birth a Blow to Privacy, BUFFALO NEWS,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Bufuews File.
35. See Jack Boulware, Web Rouser: Former Lusty Lady Dancer Caity McPherson Struggles to
Make a Living on the Oversexed Internet, NEW TIMES SF WKLY . , Mar. 31, 1999, available in LEXIS,
News Library, New Times SF Wkly. File; Michael Saunders, Web's Red-light District Shines in Tech
nology, Profits, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 1998, at C 7 available in LEXIS, News Library, BGlobe File.
36. See Jennicam (visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www . jennicam. com>. The initial screen of the
motives to be public education.

June 20, 1998, at 3C,

,

Web site, visited November 16, 1999, reads like a dictionary entry which defines Jennicam as "a real-
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lenni's Web stardom provides a good illustration of the disconnection
between privacy and data control. Because Jenni is free to tum her camera
off and close down her Web site, she is free to exercise the partial capacity
she shares with most other Americans to control access to personal infor
mation about the details of her home life and, to that extent, to restore her
privacy. But as long as the camera is feeding images of her to others and
others are watching, she has no physical privacy to speak of, and others
possess otherwise private information about her home life. That Jenni has
control of the camera does not mean that she has privacy.

In fact, what

makes Jenni, Ana, and similar web performers popular is the fascination
we have with people who are willing to forego the usual domestic privacies
for public amusement or reflection.
nor is it necessary.

Control is not sufficient for privacy,

A prison inmate locked in solitary confinement has

privacy-too much of it-but no control over personal information, since
prison officials can enter his quarters or perhaps access surveillance camera
images of him at will.37 The kind of mandatory privacy the inmate experi
ences is not a form of privacy most people would want for themselves. Yet
most of us approve of at least some forms of punitive or disciplinary soli
tary confinement in the context of criminal corrections, and sometimes
voluntarily isolate ourselves from others.
Defining "privacy" as data control directs our attention to the questions
of consent and choice.38

But if what people in control are choosing and

consenting to is making themselves informationally and physically more
accessible to others, the states of affairs they are bringing about are not
privacy, but the opposite of privacy.

Physical and informational privacy

time look into the real life of a young woman " and "an undramatized photographic diary for public
viewing esp. via Internet. " !d.

The site claims that cameras show the bedrooms, living room, and

dining room of lenni's home, and promises a roving camera soon. Jennicam membership costs $15 for
a 12-month subscription. Non-members can visit the Jennicam Gallery, a sample of images, showing
photographs of lenni's feet, eyes, nude back, and torso, plus Jenni bathing, caressing a lover in bed,
entertaining a gathering of friends, and working at her desk.
37.

Compare what Ferdinand Schoeman has written:

Privacy has been identified also as the measure of

control

an individual has over: 1. infor

mation about himself; 2. intimacies of personal identity; or 3. who has sensory access to
him. . . . [This definition] presents some difficulties. . . . [It] . . . seem[s] particularly vul
nerable to a number of counterexamples. We can easily imagine a person living in a state of
complete privacy but lacking control over who has access to information about him. . . . To
take another example, a person who chose to exercise his discretionary control over infor
mation about himself by divulging everything cannot be said to have lost control, although
he surely cannot be said to have any privacy.
Ferdinand Schoeman,
PRIVACY,

supra

Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
cf CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 19 (1999) ("Both the

note 26, at 1, 2-3;

prison and the concentration camp deprive inmates of freedom, but the tearing away of every shred of
privacy is what deprives them of dignity and causes them to surrender their hold of the sense of self.").
38.

It also draws our attention to the concept of "data," which invites us to conceive of personal

information from the distinctively utilitarian perspective of one for whom the information has value
only to the extent that it can be packaged in standardized and bureaucratically manipulable formats.
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Informational privacy obtains where

information actually exists in a state of inaccessibility, whether it is locked
in a file drawer, computer, or in someone's mind. Anonymity, confidenti
ality, reserve, and secrecy-not merely having the choice to bring these
about-are forms of privacy.

People who could enjoy privacy and are in

control of personal information are choosing to give up privacy. It is for
this reason that commentators troubled by people deciding to broadcast
otherwise intimate or confidential conduct over the Internet have begun to
ask the question whether it is possible to invade your own privacy.40 You
can invade (that is diminish) your own privacy the same way you can di
minish your own freedom.

In the era of slavery, it was not said that the

free man who sold himself into slavery remained free because servitude
was his choice, and we should not say that a private person who voluntary
gives up privacy remains private. And just as the moral and policy impli
cations of voluntary servitude have troubled us, so too, should the moral
and policy implications of voluntary loss of privacy.
III. 1HE PRACTICAL LIMITS OF THE DATA-CONTROL PARADIGM
To the argument in Part II that conceptual limitations burden the pri
vacy-control paradigm, I now add the argument that there are practical
limits.

In explaining conceptual limits, I focused on the privacy-control

paradigm's definitional notion that "privacy" means data control, and sug
gested that privacy is open to broader and more perspicacious definitional
analysis, as the philosophical literature reflects.

In explaining practical

limits, I begin by focusing on the privacy-control paradigm's notion that
rights of privacy are rights of data control. Here, I suggest that Professor
Schwartz's concerns about whether people can actually control personal
data are well-taken. It is pointless (or merely symbolic) to ascribe a right
to data control if it turns out that exercising the right is impossible.
Professor Schwartz stresses the practical difficulties attending the no
tion that controlling personal data is the basis of a meaningful right, in cy
berspace or offline.

Control over personal information is an illusion, he

argues. Typical Internet users disclose a great deal of information.41 They
do so directly and knowingly as they purchase goods and services or send
e-mail.

They do so less directly and knowingly as their travels through

cyberspace deposit cookies,42 and as firms with whom they do business

39. See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 11, at 13-18.
40. See Margaret Talbot, Candid Camera, N EW REPUBLIC,

Oct

.

26, 1998, available in LEXIS,

News Library, Newrpb File.

41. See generally THOMAS A. PETERS,
310 (1999).
42. As Reginald Whitaker has written:

COMPUTERIZED MONITORING AND ONLINE PRIVACY

196-

coNNECTI
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Schwartz's case against the right to control data has both a practical argu
ment-privacy is inefficient-and a moral side--privacy is irresponsible.
Even if data control were possible and practical, it could be argued that for
moral reasons people ought not to be ascribed a right to data control, and
that enhancing individual control over personal data is not morally worthy
as a central objective of privacy regulation.

IV. THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE DATA-CONTROL PARADIGM
The privacy-control paradigm can obscure that in so many policy con
texts it is wrong to insist on individual control over personal data.

One

policy concern is that people will want too little privacy. That is, that they
will use rights of data control to give up forms of privacy deemed vital to
their interests.

This concerns militates against designing privacy policies

focused solely on enhancing control over personal data by individuals.
Doing so may be neither in their interests nor in the interests of the greater
society. Liberals have generally assumed that privacy is something people
want and that the main goal of public policy is to enhance their capacity to
get what they want. This effort to maximize choice is problematic though,
if it turns out that people are choosing to give up more privacy than is con
sistent with liberal conceptions of the person or the liberal way of life.
Unless people want privacy, neither government nor private sector
policies aimed at individual data control and individual stewardship of per
sonal information can insure privacy.

People who ascribe to legal rights

and entitlements to control personal data may choose to share more data
than they conceal.

They may prefer disclosure for the sake of monetary

profit, artistic creation, public education, medical care, commercial trans
actions, entertainment, or community. Policy-makers may proceed on the
basis of one of two assumptions:

(1)

the anti-paternalist assumption that

personal privacy is a good only to the extent that people want it (and there
fore that it should not be forced on people); or

(2)

the paternalist assump

tion that personal privacy is a good, even for those who do not want it (and
therefore that efforts should be made to alter preferences or to coerce pri
vacy).

The idea of "coercing privacy" sounds strange, but is really quite

familiar.45

Certain laws already mandate privacy, such as the (popular)

laws that require that clothing be worn in public places and the (much criti
cized) regulations that prohibit military service members from disclosing
their sexual orientation.

The building codes that regulate the design and

placement of residential housing also mandate privacy.

A Manhattan

builder does not have the option of constructing an apartment building en
tirely of transparent glass.

!vlany social norms that fall short of law that

once coerced privacy have eroded in recent years, giving way to openness

45.

See generally Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note ll, at 723.
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about matters of health, sexuality, and opinion. The culture of "exhibi
tionism and voyeurism" is evidence of this erosion. To aggressively pro
tect privacy, policy-makers may be required to adopt policies that require
certain privacies, want them or not. They may be required to undertake the
formative project of creating citizens who want certain personally and so
cially beneficial forms of privacy.
The privacy-control paradigm obscures the need for concern that peo
ple will want too little privacy, and also the concern that people will want
too much privacy. A sense of moral responsibility for one's conduct and a
desire for morally responsive public policies might lead to abandonment of
enhancing individual data control as the central objective of privacy policy.
For example, the demands of responsible employment place a moral limit
on policies that might purport to give workers greater control over personal
financial and health information. To take another example, it might seem
innocuous to make the assertion that people should be able to control per
sonal financial data, until one realizes that our political obligations to our
country and fellow citizens make that impossible.

As James Rule and

Lawrence Hunter have observed, "if governments are expected to tax in
come or commerce . . . citizens can hardly expect control over information
about their personal finances."46 It would seem unwise to prohibit the con
stitutionally mandated decennial census-takers from collecting personal
information about household income. Welfare, Social Security, disaster
relief, student loans-all of these public benefits should be available, but
surely require moral accountability in the form of personal financial disclo
sures.
The area of health care delivery and medical record privacy is a good
one to examine for purposes of exposing the weaknesses of a privacy
control paradigm. Medical privacy is important. Many people have felt a
need to conceal their bodies and information about the condition of their
bodies and minds, particularly when they are ill and aging. Moreover, it is
important to many people that they or someone they designate make some
of the key decisions about the context and scope of health care and disclo
sures. The central aim of medical record policy cannot be to give individu
als complete control over medical inforn1ation.

Information sharing is a

sine qua non of modem health care delivery, and also
quirement of insurance.

a

bureaucratic re

The twin demands of confidential disclosure to

health providers and accountability to insurers entail that the individual
cannot control personal medical data once he or she decides to seek profes
sional care. To speak of controlling medical data is also problematic be
cause of the difficulty of concealing health matters from family, friends,
co-workers, and even strangers. If a woman discovers a lump in her breast,

46.

James Rule & Lawrence Hunter,

PRIVACY,

supra note 44,

at 168, 169-70.
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she can control the time and place that information about her tumor is
shared with others. However, the list of medical conditions that are plainly
visible to others is extremely long: alcoholism, jaundice, Alzheimer' s,
Parkinson's, psoriasis, deafness, tuberculosis, and skin cancer cannot be
concealed. The interests we have in medical privacy are best addressed by
focusing less on the misleading ideal of controlling medical information,
and more on the wider concerns of, first, the social norms of civility, re
spect and responsibility (that help us manage the medical information we
possess

about

ourselves

and

others),

and

second,

fair

information

practices47 (such as informed consent, patient access to records, limited
dissemination by providers and insurers, and the accuracy and security of
records and systems of records, that health providers, insurers and others
ethically and accountably gather, maintain, and share personal information
entrusted to them).
These moral qualms about the "privacy control" paradigm do not entail
that complete custody of personal data should be uncritically yielded in
every case to police and government agencies. Nor do moral qualms about
the importance of willingness to share information entail that e-commerce
should be conducted with no attention to consumer information privacy
interests. However, they are meant to suggest that because personal infor
mation cannot and should not be substantially controlled by individuals,
privacy enhancing technologies should be thought of as just that privacy
enhancing, not privacy controlling, technologies.

They are also meant to

suggest that because it is both misleading and wrong to hold up "privacy
control" as such a policy aim, something very different and more complex
than data-control is the realistic aim of e-commerce and marketing privacy
policies. Precisely defining this "something very different" is one of the
most challenging tasks on the table for privacy policy theorists. Professor
Amitai Etzioni is content to call it balancing individual and entity interests
in light of the common good.48

Professor Schwartz tries to get at this al

ternative to data control when he points to the need to think of privacy con
stitutively and to understand that respect for it requires contextual line
drawing.
What would Schwartz's suggested approach look like in practice?
imagine this.

Consider the case Wine Hobby USA, Inc.

v.

I

United States

JRS.49 Wine Hobby was the seller and distributor of avocational equipment
for the making of wine. The company wished to market its products to an

47. See Mary 1. Culnan & Robert J. Bies, Managing Privacy Concerns Strategically: The Implica
tions of Fair Information Practices for Marketing in the Twenty-First Century, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY,
supra note 44, at 6, 149 (introduction listing the fair infonnation practices about which there is emerg
ing international consensus, and article elaborating an expansive understanding of such policies).
48. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY ( 1 999).
49. 502 F.2d 1 33 (3d Cir. 1974).
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individual wine hobbyist, and filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)50
request for a copy of the list of persons registered (as required by law) with
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as producers of wine for
"family use."

The government responded, claiming that the information

could not be disclosed because of Exemption 6 of the Act, which excludes

from the coverage of the Act "personnel and medical and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
privacy."51

The court found for the government. It did not, however, as

sert that citizens have a right to control personal information, rather, it de
scribed the need to balance competing interests. In explicating the family
wine-makers' privacy interests, the court focused on American cultural
traditions of family and domestic privacy-that is, on constitutive privacy
norms.

The idea that citizens have an absolute right to control personal

information is contradicted by the mandatory government wine production
reporting requirement itself. The government' s registration regulation de
nied persons a right to control information sufficient to exclude govern
ment.

However, the family-privacy protecting interpretation of FOIA in

this case construes government as a confidant rather than a broadcaster.
The sense of privacy is offended by having others load our mailboxes with
solicitations and advertisements based on information about our habits and
avocations obtained as a result of a mandatory reporting requirement. The
government that makes us accountable for taxation due on potentially lu
crative wine production also limits access to personal information that we
yield reluctantly and for which othe-rs have considerably less than a com
pelling need. Important to a constitutive conception of privacy is what
Schwartz calls the "pattern of knowledge" represented by public disclosure
of registered family wine producers' identities to third parties intending
commercial usage.

Although our common identities as participants in a

free and open society support the goal of open records embodied in FOIA,
and our needs as a market economy include cheap information, the bound
ary around the family home endorsed by the court is also one Schwartz
could support.

For while it is Professor Schwartz's view that we must

avoid the "data fortress that isolates personal information in some absolute
sense,"52 we also must avoid a way of life that turns our desire to know
what government is up to into a way of life that will permit fellow citizens
to know what we as law-abiding citizens are up to in our homes and family
lives.

50. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III 1997).
5 1. /d. §552(b)(6) (exception for personnel and medical and similar files).
52. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 834.
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V. CONCLUSION

The appeal of the privacy- control paradigm is the appeal of the idea
that privacy protection, virtually by definition, is all about vesting control
over personal information in the individual. I have attempted to clearly
outline the conceptual, practical, and moral limits of the privacy- control
paradigm that embodies thi s fac ially appealing idea. I elaborated the para
digm as consisting of the three severable notions that "privacy" means per
sonal data control or rights of data control; that the right of privacy is a
right of personal data control ; and that enhancing personal data control by
individuals is the optimal end of privacy regulation. Recognition of the
limits of the paradigm must lead serious adherents to respond w ith efforts
to repair or replace it.

